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ABSTRACT 
After the September 11 attacks, the U.S. initiated the Global War on 
Terror.  Prosecution of this war has become a defining objective of the Bush era 
in American foreign policy. Following the invasion of Afghanistan, the United 
States invaded Iraq.  As part of the invasion plan, the United States requested 
permission to deploy troops in Turkey to invade Iraq over its northern frontiers. 
The subsequent rejection of this request by the Turkish Parliament destabilized 
the relationship between the United States and Turkey.  These events have 
placed U.S.-Turkish relations on an uncertain footing.  This thesis seeks to 
explore the path towards the crisis in these relations. It argues that that the 
parameters of the bilateral relations have changed significantly since the 
September 11 attacks. The thesis provides a chronological analysis of history of 
Turkish-American relations focusing on the recent events.  Last, the thesis will 
offer recommendations on how U.S.-Turkish relations can be restored, drawing 
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I. THESIS INTRODUCTION 
Turkey’s geostrategic importance in containing the Soviet threat formed an 
overriding backdrop that helped create a close relationship between Turkey and 
the United States throughout the Cold War. Turkey joined the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952 after joining the United Nations coalition that 
contributed forces to the Korean War. During the Cold War, the Turkish-U.S. 
relationship improved but was periodically shaken by events such as the Turkish 
intervention in Cyprus in 1974 and the US embargo in 1975–78. However, in 
general, it can be said that the Turkey-U.S. relationship successfully contributed 
to the strategy of containment of the communist threat.1 
With the end of the Cold War, Turkey’s geostrategic role in the world 
underwent a change and some argued that Turkey had lost its strategic 
importance. As a result, U.S.-Turkish relations received criticisms in both 
countries. The relationship endured during the 1990s.  Operation Desert Storm 
was seen by supporters of the relationship as a pivotal event, showing that 
despite the end of the Cold War, the bilateral relationship between the United 
States and Turkey was still important. For this reason, Turkey and the United 
States labeled their bilateral relationship an enhanced partnership in 1991.2 
The conflicts that arose around the globe after 1990 created opportunities 
for both countries to enhance this partnership in other significant ways. In this 
decade, Turkey joined many international efforts to sustain peace and stability, 
contributing troops to more than thirty operations around the globe.3 Turkey sent 
three hundred troops into Somalia under the UNOSOM II (United Nations 
                                            
1 Naci Dogan, “International System in the Point of the New World System, the Role of NATO 
and the Strategic Position of Turkey,” Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi 10 (2005): 25. 
2 Omer Goksel Isyar, “An Analysis of Turkish-American Relations from 1945 to 2004: 
Initiatives and Reactions in Turkish Foreign Policy,” Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International 
Relations 4, No. 3 (2005), p. 33, http://www.alternativesjournal.net/volume4/number3/isyar.pdf 
(accessed March 1, 2007). 
3 Contribution of Turkish Armed Forces to Peace Support Operations, 
http://www.tsk.mil.tr/eng/uluslararasi/barisdestekkatki.htm (accessed March 1, 2007). 
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Operation in Somalia) command in 1993 and at various points served as the 
command element for the force. Acting on its historical ties, Turkey sent fourteen 
hundred troops to help its Bosnian friends under UNPROFOR (United Nations 
Protection Force) command in 1993. These troops worked also under the IFOR 
(Implementation Force) command. Kosovo was another crisis in which Turkish 
and U.S. forces worked together under NATO command. Turkey contributed to 
the NATO air operation, supplying it with twenty-one planes including F-16 
fighters and KC-135 aerial refueling tankers in 1999. Intelligence cooperation 
with the U.S. during the capture of the bloody terrorist leader Abdullah Ocalan in 
February 1999, as well as U.S. President Clinton’s naming of the Turkish-
American relationship a strategic partnership during his Turkish Grand National 
Assembly address, in November 1999, can be seen as proof of the warm 
bilateral relationship. 4 
As a country that has been fighting terrorism since the 1980s, Turkey 
condemned the September 11 attacks against the United States and proclaimed 
its allegiance with the United States in its war on terrorism. To that end, Turkey 
has commanded the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 
Afghanistan twice and contributed varying numbers of troops to this force.5  
However, in March 2003 in a controversial decision, the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly disallowed the passage of U.S. troops through Turkey to Iraq. 
Turkey did permit coalition forces to use its airspace.6  Consequently, bilateral 
relations suffered, and it took some time and effort to recover from that point.  
In spite of the fact that these events shook the bilateral relationship 
between the two countries, it appeared that Turkey and the United States had 
somewhat restored their close relationship at the NATO Summit in Istanbul in 
June 2004. There, U.S. President George W. Bush stated that Turkey was of 
                                            
4 Kemal Koprulu, “Paradigm Shift in Turkish-US Relations,” Turkish Policy Quarterly 4, No.1, 
(2005), p. 2, http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_turkey_tpq_id_23.pdf (accessed March 1, 2007).  
5 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Operation, 
http://www.tsk.mil.tr/eng/uluslararasi/isaf.htm (accessed March 1, 2007). 
6 Aylin Guney, An Anatomy of the Transformation of the US-Turkish Alliance: From Cold War 
to War on Iraq, Turkish Studies, Vol. 6, No. 3, September 2005, p. 351. 
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vital importance for peace in Europe and the Middle East.7 In the meantime, in its 
support for the reconstruction efforts in Iraq, Turkey steadily became a vital 
logistical base for Iraq. Many Turkish companies have contributed to the 
reconstruction process. In addition to this, the basic needs of the Iraqi people ― 
including food, electricity and water ― have been supplied through Turkey.8 As 
further proof of warming relations, Turkey and the United States jointly signed a 
Shared Vision statement in July 2006.9  
Turkey and the United States also dispatched special envoys to discuss 
possible joint efforts to counter the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) terrorist 
organization.10 This mechanism proved to be fruitless as the leaders from both 
sides, designated to coordinate these efforts, left their posts within one year. In 
addition, the House Foreign Affairs Committee voted to approve a resolution that 
recognized the deportation of Ottoman Armenians during World War I as 
genocide.11 As a result, bilateral relations have been strained through increasing 
PKK terrorist activities and U.S. inaction towards the PKK camps and their 
presence in northern Iraq. 
This thesis argues that the parameters of the bilateral relations have 
changed significantly in Turkish-American relations since the end of the Cold 
War. During the Cold War, the main pillar of the bilateral relations was the Soviet 
threat of communist expansion. All other parameters in the alliance took shape 
according to this common threat, and thus through the eyes of Washington, 
                                            
7 President Bush Discusses Democracy, Freedom from Turkey, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040629-4.html (accessed March 1, 2007).  
8 Turkiye-Irak Ekonomik Ilişkileri ve Turkiye´nin Yeniden Imar Surecine Katkisi, 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA_tr/DisPolitika/Bolgeler/OrtaDogu/Irak/Irak_Ekonomik.htm (accessed 
March 1, 2007). 
9 Ortak Vizyon Belgesi Aciklandi, http://www.voanews.com/turkish/archive/2006-07/2006-07-
05-voa6.cfm (accessed March 1, 2007). 
10 Special U.S. Envoy named for Countering Kurdish Terror Group, 
http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-
english&y=2006&m=August&x=20060828171825xlrennef0.3752863 (accessed March 1, 2007). 
11 Soner Cagaptay, “The PKK and the Armenian Genocide Resolution: U.S.-Turkish 
Relations at a Critical Juncture,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy 
Watch.1293 (2007), p.1, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2669, 
(accessed October 24, 2007). 
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Turkey was NATO’s southern flank country that had vital importance against 
Soviet expansion in this region. On the other hand, when situations that impacted 
each country’s own vital interests took place, both countries acted unilaterally in 
terms of their own interests. The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the 1974 Turkish 
Cyprus intervention are both good examples.  
The end of the Cold War might be seen as the birth of the new parameters 
of Turkish-American relations. The relationship that had been called an 
enhanced partnership in 1991, increased to a strategic partnership at the end of 
the decade. The Soviet threat, which had been the main pillar for the alliance 
was gone, but sustaining peace in the Balkans and in the Middle East and 
helping newly emerged states from the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
superseded the main parameters of the bilateral relations.12 The First Gulf War, 
Bosnia and the Kosovo Crisis can also be seen in this regard. The relations 
spectrum diversified into economic and political avenues in this decade including,  
increasing economic trade between the two countries, Washington’s support for 
Turkey’s accession to the E.U. and joint investments in Central Asia.13  
The September 11 attacks and the U.S. response to the attacks by 
declaring war on terrorism have also affected the parameters of the bilateral 
relations. Incongruously, however, the major fracture has been caused by the 
U.S. invasion of Iraq. 
This thesis aims to locate the new parameters of Turkish-American 
relations since the September 11 attacks. Chapter I will summarize the history of 
of Turkish-American relations.  Chapter II will employ a chronological analysis 
that highlights the evolving relations between the two countries after the 9/11 
attacks and the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Chapter III will focus on the relations after 
the United States declared its intention to invade Iraq. This chapter will also 
cover the aftermath of the U.S. invasion of Iraq until 2006 when the PKK 
                                            
12 Remarks by the President in Address to the Turkish Grand National Assembly, 
http://clinton4.nara.gov/textonly/WH/New/Europe-9911/remarks/1999-11-15d.html (accessed 
March 1, 2007). 
13 Sedat Laciner, “Ozalism (Neo-Ottomanism): An Alternative in Turkish Foreign Policy?” 
Journal of Administrative Sciences 1 (2003): 182-85.  
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increased terrorist activities in Turkey. In Chapter IV, the bilateral relations up to 
present day will be reviewed and analyzed. Using this chronological context, it is 
then easy to frame the new parameters of Turkish-American relations. The 
conclusions chapter will attempt to articulate the reasons for the current tension 
in the bilateral relations, and will offer recommendations on how to restore and 
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TURKISH-AMERICAN 
RELATIONS 
A. PRE- COLD WAR 
The first official Turkish–American relationship began in 1830 with a trade 
agreement between the Ottoman Empire and the United States.14  In the 
following years, both countries reciprocally opened an embassy in the other’s 
country. In addition to these developments, American missionaries came to 
Ottoman lands.  As missionaries from other foreign countries had already been 
there since 1583, however, the Americans mainly focused on the Armenians in 
the Ottoman Empire.15 As a result, many American schools, churches and 
hospitals opened in the Ottoman cities where the Armenian population was high. 
By the late nineteenth century, these schools numbered more than four 
hundred.16   
In 1862, the Ottoman Empire and the United States signed a second trade 
agreement, upon which the United States had conferred the most favored nation 
status. The Ottoman Empire’s support of the North during the U.S. Civil War 
increased bilateral cooperation and confidence.17 In the years following, the 
Ottoman Empire began to purchase arms from the United States because the 
end of the nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth century were 
war years for the Ottoman Empire. Although these two countries did not declare 
war against each other in the First World War, relations stagnated for a while 
because of the ongoing Independence War in Anatolia. A committee headed by 
                                            
14 Fahir Armaoğlu, “Atatürk Döneminde Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri,” Atatürk Araştirma Merkezi 
Dergisi 38 (1997): 1. 
15 Yavuz Güler, “The Relationship between Turkey and USA in the Period of the Ottoman 
Empire (1795-1914),” Gazi Üniversitesi Kirşehir Eğitim Fakültesi Dergisi 6 (2005): 236. See also 
Cagri Erhan, “Ottoman Official Attitudes towards American Missionaries,” paper presented at the 
conference on The United States Relations with the Middle East: Cultural Encounters, New 
Haven, Yale University, December 2000, pp. 315- 17.  
16 Ibid, p. 237.  
17 Mustafa Kayar, Turk Amerikan Iliskilerinde Irak Sorunu (Istanbul: IQ Kultur Sanat 
Yayincilik, 2003), 106. 
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General Harbord visited Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in Sivas in 1919 to fulfill the 
requirements for conducting a fact-finding mission given him by the Paris Peace 
Conference.18 After the Turkish Independence War and the founding of the 
Turkish Republic, both sides reciprocally opened an embassy in the other’s 
country in 1927.  
During the early years of modern Turkey, relations became strained due to 
the American schools and missionary actions. In 1928, Turkish public tension 
increased in reaction to an event that took place in the Bursa American Girls’ 
College. Three Turkish girls became Christian through the influence of their 
teacher. This event was seen as contrary to the secularism principle by the 
Turkish government and the judiciary; thus the school was closed.19  
Turkey and the United States signed a trade agreement in 1929, but the 
relations between the two countries gained momentum after the election of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932 and Ataturk’s letter of condolence to the U.S. 
president after the Los Angeles earthquake in 1933. Continuing correspondence 
between Roosevelt and Ataturk played a part in warming relations between the 
two nations.20  
In 1935, General MacArthur visited Ataturk. During their talk about the 
future of Europe, Ataturk said: 
America will not be able to avoid war and Germany will be defeated 
only through her interference. If authorities in Europe do not get 
together on the basis of controversies of political contacts and try to 
placate their own hatreds and interests, it will be tragic…The 
victorious power after the war between 1940 and 1945 will not be 
England, France, or Germany, but Bolshevism. Being closest to 
Russia and having had many wars with her in the past, Turkey is 
watching Russia closely and sees the whole danger developing. 
Russia knows how to influence and awaken the minds of Eastern 
                                            
18 Hulki Cevizoglu, İşgal ve Direniş 1919 ve Bugun (Ankara: Ceviz Kabuğu Yayinlari, 2007), 
299-300.  
19 Ayten Sezer, “Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e; Misyonerlerin Türkiye'deki Eğitim ve .Oğretim 
Faaliyetleri,” Hacettepe Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Dergisi Special Edition (1999), 179, 
www.edebiyatdergisi.hacettepe.edu.tr/700ozelAytenSezer.pdf (accessed March 1, 2007). 
20 Armaoglu, pp. 11-15.  
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countries, and how to give them ideas of nationalism. Russia has 
encouraged hatred towards the West. Bolshevism is getting to be a 
power and a great threat to Europe and Asia.21 
 
General MacArthur agreed with Ataturk and added his views on the 
Japanese threat in Asia. At the end of their talk, Ataturk emphasized: 
Our points of view are almost the same, but let us hope we see it all 
incorrectly and that the leaders of the other nations will come up 
with a better result for the whole world.22 
  
B. COLD WAR 
During the Second World War, despite efforts from both sides, Turkey 
remained neutral due to the economic conditions in Turkey. Turkey was still 
trying to cure the deep traumas caused by the collapse of the Ottoman Empire 
and the Independence War and sought to avoid getting involved in another war 
that could hamper its economic recovery. Second World War ended as Ataturk 
had predicted. The Soviet Union emerged from the Second World War as a 
superpower as a consequence of its achievement in building up an impressive 
military might both in conventional and nuclear weaponry. In turn, they felt that 
they could challenge the other superpower, the United States. On March 19, 
1945, the Soviet Union informed Turkey that henceforth the 1925 Treaty of 
Friendship and Non-Aggression Pact was invalid. In addition, on June 7, 1945, 
the Soviet Union initiated demands on Turkey’s eastern provinces such as Kars 
and Ardahan, as well as some rights over the control of the Straits. 
In response to the emerging Soviet and communist threat, the United 
States renewed its foreign policy. According to the predictions, if the Soviet Union 
controlled Turkey, the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean could also 
succumb to Soviet rule, and communist ideology would harm the vital interests of 
                                            
21 Mahmut Esat Ozan, “Atatürk's Prophesies: Why Douglas MacArthur Believed in them 
too?” Voice of Ataturk, Ataturk Society of America,  
http://www.ataturksociety.org/asa/voa/ozan.html (accessed October 17, 2007). 
22 Ibid.  
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the United States in that region. In this respect, Turkey’s geostrategic position 
was a key factor for containing the Soviet and communist expansion. The English 
memorandums to the United States concerning Turkey and Greece also added 
to these calculations made by the United States. As a result, on March 12, 1947, 
U.S. President Truman addressed Congress and made the case for starting 
aggressive economic and military assistance programs to help these two 
countries. The United States started foreign aid to Turkey after signing a bilateral 
agreement on July 12, 1947. This proved the commitment of the United States as 
part of the Truman Doctrine, which focused on a policy of containment of Soviet 
expansion. 
Turkey and the United States signed a second bilateral agreement on July 
8, 1948, and Turkey received financial aid for the following three years via the 
Marshall Plan. With this aid, Turkey started to modernize its armed forces23 and 
the United States secured a front state against the Soviet Union and in the 
process, “got rid of some of its Second World War surplus arms stockpile.”24 
In 1950, in accordance with the United Nations’ call, Turkey contributed 
more than five thousand troops to U.S.-lead military forces during the Korean 
War. The Menderes administration made this decision without receiving the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly’s approval. This was the first military 
commitment of the Turkish Republic in which Turkish and American soldiers 
fought against a common enemy. Turkey lost 741 soldiers, and 2147 wounded 
came home. The Turkish Brigade’s bravery increased Turkish popularity among 
UN forces, as well as its U.S. counterparts during this war.25 It might be said that 
the military commitment of Turkey in the Korean War was clear evidence that 
Turkey had chosen to align itself with the U.S. in this new bipolar world. Before 
the end of the war, in 1952, Turkey joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
                                            
23 Feroz Ahmad, “The Historical Background of Turkey’s Foreign Policy,” in The Future of 
Turkish Foreign Policy, ed. Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis (Cambridge:The MIT Press, 
2004), 30. Also see Metin Aydogan, Bitmeyen Oyun: Turkiye'yi Bekleyen Tehlikeler (Istanbul: 
Umay Yayinlari, 2004), 133-53. 
24 Guler, p. 219.  
25 Guney, p. 342. 
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(NATO). Amikam Nachmani argued that, “Turkey’s participation in the Korean 
War bought it the entrance ticket into the NATO.”26 In contrast, Feroz Ahmad 
claimed that Turkish President Bayar’s expression over Turkey’s reappraising of 
its Cold War orientation was the driving force for Turkey’s admittance into 
NATO.27       
Because of the Soviet threat, NATO membership was considered highly 
important by Turkish decision makers. On the other hand, Turkey’s strategic 
location was seen as vital by other members of NATO ― especially by the United 
States — as a way to contain Soviet expansion. In this respect, it might be 
relevant to say that the Turkish commitment to the Korean War opened the door 
to cooperation between both nations.  
Turkey and the United States signed many bilateral agreements and acted 
mutually supportive between 1950 and 1960. During these years, Turkey and the 
United States searched for ways to unite the Middle East countries against the 
Soviet threat, in spite of the fact that in May of 1953 the Soviet Union claimed it 
had no designs on Turkey.28 The Middle East Defense Organization was a 
mutually supportive agreement that could not be successfully achieved due to 
the refusal of Egyptian President Nasser to support the initiative. However, in 
1955, the Baghdad Pact began with a formal agreement between Turkey and 
Iraq.29 Pakistan, Iran and the United Kingdom later joined the Baghdad Pact. The 
United States did not join the pact but did support it. In 1959, the Baghdad Pact 
became known as the Central Treaty Organization because of Iraq’s withdrawal 
from the pact. In 1954, Turkey and the United States signed a bilateral 
agreement, which allowed the United States to open a military base and to 
station military personnel in Turkey. According to Aylin Guney, the U.S. gained 
                                            
26 Amikam Nachmani, Turkey: Facing a New Millennium Coping with Intertwined Conflicts 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), 1. 
27 Ahmad, p. 32. 
28 William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000 (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002), 
122. 
29 Kayar, pp. 123- 125.  
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access to over thirty installations with five thousand U.S. personnel, which were 
engaged in defense missions including intelligence-collecting activities.30  In 
1958, Turkey allowed the U.S. to use the Incirlik air base for the intervention in 
Lebanon, even though it was not a NATO operation.31 In light of all of these 
mutual attempts, the 1950s could be seen as years of harmony for Turkish-
American bilateral relations.  
In contrast, the 1960s were years in which this mutual and supportive 
relationship became questionable, especially by Turkey. The opening of the 
decade came with the U-2 crisis between Washington and Moscow in 196032 
when the Soviets shot down a U.S. U-2 spy plane over Soviet territory. Moscow 
threatened Turkey because it had allowed the plane to use Turkish bases. 
Turkey defended itself, declaring that the U-2 took off from Pakistan and headed 
to Norway; thus Turkey was in no way responsible for the situation. On the other 
hand, Turkey had requested information from the U.S. about these kinds of 
flights and canceled all U-2 flights from its soil. The crisis initiated a debate in 
Turkey concerning the reliability of the U.S.33  
In addition to the U-2 crisis in 1960, tension increased between Turkish-
American decision makers over the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. Turkish 
decision makers worried that Jupiter missiles in Turkey would be a bargaining 
chip between Washington and Moscow at the beginning of the crisis.34 They 
shared their concern with their American counterparts, who assured them that 
this would not be the case. Internally, Turkey conducted a remarkable debate 
about the installation of the Jupiter missiles. Because of its alliance with the U.S., 
the Turkish administration turned down the Soviet Union’s November 1961 offer 
                                            
30 Guney, p. 342. 
31 Hale, p. 129. See also Karasapan, p. 6. 
32 Yakup Beriş and Asli Gürkan, “Türk-Amerikan Ilişkilerine Bakiş:Ana Temalar ve Güncel 
Gelişmeler,” TUSIAD ABD Temsilciliği Değerlendirme Raporu (July 2002), p. 6.  
33 Kayar, p. 126. 
34 Ian Q. R. Thomas, The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination. (NY: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997), 69-70.  
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of some $500 million as part of the Soviet Aid Programme.35 However, if 
Washington decided to remove the Jupiter missiles, it would not have been easy 
for the Turkish authorities to explain to the people. The Turkish authorities had 
told the Turkish public many times that the missiles a represented an alliance 
and that they were under joint control.36 In reality, the Kennedy administration 
began negotiations for the removal of the Jupiter missiles from Turkey with the 
Khrushchev administration. During the crisis, Turkey was not informed about 
these developments,37 and when the crisis was resolved, Turkey learned that 
Washington had bargained with the Soviet Union about the Jupiter missiles 
without any prior consultation with Turkey.  
The whole world collectively breathed a sigh of relief at the peaceful 
resolution of the crisis at the end of October, but the U.S.-Soviet agreement 
demonstrated to Ankara that Washington could and would act unilaterally when 
its national interests were at stake.38 As a result, the event aroused suspicion in 
Turkey about Washington’s understanding of the alliance. In order to lessen 
public reaction to this matter, the Turkish Foreign Minister had to announce that 
the missiles were removed because they were not helpful in the protection of 
Turkey.39 
The 1960s were also important for Turkey in relation to the events that 
occurred in Cyprus. The Greek and Turkish people of Cyprus formed the Cyprus 
Republic in 1960 wherein Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom became the 
guarantors of the nations on the island and of the Cyprus Republic. In practice, 
the Greek side attempted to change the constitution and began to realize the 
Akritas Plan (The plan was aimed toward the eventual unification of the island 
                                            
35 Hale, p. 122. 
36 Karasapan, p. 6. 
37 Beris and Gurkan, p. 6.  
38 Kayar, p. 126. 
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with Greece40), which has never been denied by the Greek side.41 Greek Cypriot 
police and the Greek Cypriot Army attacked Turkish homes and villages to kill 
Turkish people in December 1963.42 The photographs of the mass killing, the 
“Bloody Christmas” photographs, appeared in Turkish newspapers, which 
initiated huge protest meetings in Turkey. 
Until 1963, the U.S. generally pursued a policy of non-intervention in the 
Cyprus situation. The U.S. approach changed after 1963 as a result of Turkey’s 
threat to intervene militarily and Greece’s threat to withdraw from NATO. The 
U.S. wanted to prevent weaknesses inside NATO that might have invited 
possible Soviet involvement and exploitation.43  
On June 5, 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson sent a letter to Turkish 
president Ismet Inonu that had profound effects on U.S.-Turkish relations.44 In 
this letter, the United States asserted that in the event there was a Turkish 
invasion of Cyprus, this could leave Turkey face-to-face with the Soviets, and 
NATO and the U.S. would not help Turkey in this situation.45  The United States 
also informed Turkey that it could not use the weapons that Turkey had 
purchased from the United States.46 In response to these developments, Turkey 
delayed its military operation. On the other hand, Turkey understood that both 
sides perceived the situation on Cyprus much differently. Ankara gradually came 
to the realization that Turkey might have to act unilaterally and face the 
consequences from the United States. It is generally accepted that Johnson's 
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letter compelled the Turkish government and the Turkish public to take a closer 
look at the very nature of the Turkish-American relations.47 Thus, because of 
Turkish requests, bilateral agreements between the two countries were revised 
and collected under the Bilateral Defense and Cooperation Agreement in 1969.48 
Inside Turkey, the effect of the troubled bilateral relations appeared as a growing 
anti-Americanism. This anti-American rhetoric reached such high levels in Turkey 
that even the United States banned its officers based in Turkey from wearing 
military uniforms in the public environment.49    
In 1974, the situation in Cyprus deteriorated when on 15 July 1974 Greek 
officers and the EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) organized a 
coup d’etat in Cyprus. In reaction, Turkey began the Cyprus Peace Operation on 
20 July 1974, after Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit’s joint action offer was rejected 
by his British counterpart.50 Congressional pressure in the United States 
subsequently led to an arms embargo against Turkey in 1975. According to 
Guney, Turkey realized that its foreign policy had been too one-dimensional.51 
Turkey responded to this embargo by revoking the Bilateral Defense and 
Cooperation Agreement and closed all foreign military base activities except  
NATO mission activities.52 Then, Prime Minister Ecevit lifted the ban that 
prohibited opium production, which had been demanded by the U.S.53 In parallel 
to these developments, Turkey tried to diversify its source of arms imports and  
improve the development of a domestic arms industry.54 In 1978, following 
Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit’s remarks that mentioned Turkey’s inclination to 
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alter camp, the efforts to stop the embargo were increased in the United 
States.55 The embargo was revoked on August 1, 1978.  
In the following years, Turkey suffered hard times for domestic reasons. 
On the other hand, the United States needed Turkey’s support in the region due 
to cataclysmic events in 1979: the Iranian Revolution and the invasion of 
Afghanistan by the Soviet Union.56 U.S. President Ronald Reagan subsequently 
talked about bringing the Turkish-American relationship “back to the period of the 
fifties.”57 On March 29, 1980, Turkey and the United States signed the Defense 
and Economic Cooperation Agreement.58 This agreement showed both nations’ 
desire to enhance their economic, defense and related scientific and 
technological cooperation.59 On September 12, 1980, Turkish Armed Forces 
seized control of the country due to ongoing violence and political instability. 
According to Omer Goksel Isyar, after this event, the United States began to 
occupy a more important place than Europe in Turkish foreign policy.60 At the 
very least, according to Aylin Guney, military intervention did not cause any 
harmful consequence to the existing bilateral relations.61  
In parallel to the 1980 agreement, Turkish and American firms established 
many joint projects, such as the FNSS project, a joint venture company between 
the Nurol Group of Turkey and the Food Machinery Corporation of the U.S., to 
manufacture armored infantry fighting vehicles.62 In the meantime, elections 
were held in Turkey and The Motherland Party headed by Turgut Ozal won the 
popular vote in 1983. During the first Reagan administration period, bilateral 
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relations improved significantly.63 In 1983, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of 
Defense, Richard Perle summarized the bilateral relations as “the largest, most 
productive and the least understood program in Southern Europe.”64 Turkey and 
the United States also agreed to establish Rapid Deployment Forces,  modernize 
some of Turkey’s airfields and build two new airfields with the aim of 
strengthening Turkey’s eastern defenses.65 From the nuclear weapons 
perspective, Turkey also hosted a significant load in the 1980s.66  
In 1985, Turkey and the United States signed a new trade agreement to 
enhance bilateral economic investments. In addition to this, Turkey improved its 
Air Force by purchasing F-16s from the United States in 1987, and in cooperation 
with an American consortium, Turkey also entered this market as a producer.67 
Turkey also applied to the European Community (EC) for full membership 
in April 1987. The EC responded to the Turkish application in 1989, pointing out 
the obstacles on this road such as the economic gap, free movement of Turkish 
workers and  political problems.68  
In the second half of the 1980s, bilateral relations between Turkey and the 
United States slowed mainly because of Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika 
policies. These policies opened the door to dialogue between Soviet Russia and 
the United States. In return, it might be said that in the eyes of the United States, 
Turkey’s importance as NATO’s southern flank lowered. This was reflected in  
U.S. military assistance to Turkey, which had peaked in 1984 with $715 million 
and fell to $526 million in 1988.69 On the other hand, Moscow’s new policies 
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warmed and smoothed the Turkish-Soviet relations; thus, the bilateral trade 
volume rose to $1.8 billion by the end of the decade.70   
C. POST- COLD WAR 
With the end of the Cold War and the tearing down of the Berlin Wall, 
U.S.-Turkish relations entered a new period.71 The post Cold War environment 
raised a debate about Turkey’s future orientation both in Turkey and abroad. 
Some commentators posited that Turkey had lost its strategic importance 
because the Soviet threat had ended.72 Some also argued that turning to an 
isolationist policy was the best option for Turkey as the West no longer needed 
its support.73  Some also proposed a closer relationship with the Islamic 
countries so as to establish a common market, while some also proposed closer 
ties with the newborn Turkic States.74     
In the United States, Congress ended the military aid program for 
Turkey.75 It was during these years of uncertainty that Iraq invaded Kuwait on 
August 2, 1990. In response to that invasion, on 6 August 1990, Resolution 661 
was adopted by the Security Council postulating that all states shall prevent all 
trade activities with Iraq or Kuwait.76 On 8 August, Turkey declared that it would 
adhere to all of the decisions of the United Nations in this matter, and Turkey 
shut down the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik oil pipeline that had been transporting Iraqi oil to 
the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan to stop the Iraqi aggression. This was 
a considerable step for Turkey because it had been supplying 40 percent of its 
crude oil through this pipeline. In response to the increased tension, Turkey 
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increased troop levels to approximately 120,000, with air support, armor and 
transport along the Iraqi border. Turkey also allowed the coalition forces to use 
Incirlik air base.77 According to Sabri Sayari, these decisions “marked a radical 
departure from Turkey’s established policy regarding noninvolvement in regional 
conflicts and wars.”78  
Three of Turkey’s actions played a key role in the economic and military 
campaign against Saddam Hussein’s regime: it shut off the twin pipelines that 
carried Iraq’s oil exports, it permitted the use of Incirlik Air Base, and it held down 
eight Iraqi divisions in the north that could otherwise have been used against the 
coalition forces. 
Right after the First Gulf War, in April, a refugee crisis emerged when 
Saddam launched a military campaign to suppress the Kurdish rebellion in the 
north of the country. About 500,000 Iraqi Kurds escaped to the Turkish-Iraqi 
border. The Turkish Red Crescent, local villagers, and later on international aid 
agencies did their best to cope, but it soon became clear that the situation was 
unsustainable.79 The Turkish National Security Council decided to appeal to the 
United Nations Security Council for assistance. Accordingly, Security Council 
Resolution 688 declared that the repression of the Iraqi civilian population 
threatened international peace and security in the region.80 Thus, in 1991, 
Operation Provide Comfort (OPC) was created to conduct humanitarian 
operations and return refugees to their homes. In July, OPC was replaced by 
Operation Poised Hammer, which was also generally known in Turkey as Cekic 
Guc. The no-fly zone was established on 2 August 1992. If Saddam tried to 
launch any attack, he would face coalition air power and ground troops.81 
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Therefore, the Incirlik air base became crucial for the patrol of the no-fly zone 
north of the 36th parallel. The PKK exploited the collapse of Saddam’s power in 
northern Iraq, as well as the availability of arms from retreating Iraqi troops. On 4 
August, PKK terrorists attacked a gendarmerie post in Hakkari, killing nine 
Turkish soldiers and abducting seven of their comrades to PKK bases in Iraq as 
the beginning of their bloody campaign.82 Additionally in 1992, there were some 
developments in northern Iraq that resembled the rudiments of a de facto state 
formation similar to the legislative elections.  
During that period, many in Turkey voiced suspicions about the 
motivations of its Western allies, including the United States, who backed these 
developments.83   
The economy of Turkey was another concern  because the First Gulf War 
caused great economic losses for Turkey, including oil prices, land 
transportation, disruption of the construction sector, tourism sector and exports. 
Added to that, Turkey had to find an extra oil resource because of the closure of 
the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline.84   
In the post cold war era, like the First Gulf War proved, the predictions for 
a peaceful and prosperous new world order were too optimistic. Although the 
threat of an all-out war between the superpowers has decreased since the end of 
the Cold War, new and potentially more explosive problems have emerged. 
Among them, one can see a flare-up in ethnic tensions with a tendency for 
violent irredentism that has swept through much of the Balkans and the 
Caucasus with potentially disastrous consequences for the entire region. Other 
risks and threats take the form of terrorism, religious fanaticism, rapid population 
growth in the developing countries, Also, pollution on a global scale, increased 
racism and xenophobia have all gained ground.  
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In line with this new environment, Turkish-US relations have also 
changed. A new concept called the enhanced partnership was introduced in 
1991. This new concept was aimed at diversifying and deepening the Turkish-
American relationship as well as developing it on a more substantial basis.85 
Meanwhile, for a short period of time, the Erbakan Administration, in a 
coalition with the liberal True Path Party (TPP), came into power in the mid 
1990s.86  This new administration was not in favor of expanding relations either 
with America or with Western countries. While the new prime minister was paying 
a number of consecutive visits and trying to bind Turkey to Developing-8 (D-8) 
countries, he insistently rejected visiting the United States of America during his 
administration.87 However, his government collapsed after a short period of time.  
Turkey, during the 1990s, made many international attempts to sustain 
peace and stability worldwide and sent troops to more than thirty points on the 
globe. Turkey sent three hundred troops into Somalia under the UNOSOM II 
(United Nations Operation in Somalia) command in 1993 and has, for some time 
since then, taken command of this peace force. Due to its historical ties, Turkey 
sent fourteen hundred troops to help its Bosnian friends under UNPROFOR 
(United Nations Protection Force) command in 1993. These troops worked also 
under the IFOR (Implementation Force) command. Kosovo was another crisis in 
which Turkey and U.S. forces worked together under NATO command. Turkey 
contributed to the NATO air operation with twenty-one planes including F-16s 
and KC-135s in 1999.88    
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In 1997, Turkey and the United States specified five primary topics of 
mutual interest, which became known as the Five Topics Agenda. These topics 
included energy, economy and trade, regional cooperation, Cyprus and defense 
issues and security. This was in response to the US Secretary of Commerce’s 
designation of Turkey as an emerging market among the big ten emerging 
markets.89 It was clear that Turkey would have an important role in American 
trade and investment strategies in the new millennium.  
In December 1998, after the United States and Britain executed the 
Desert Fox Operation in Iraq to demolish weapons, a disagreement emerged 
between the U.S. and Turkey. Turkish authorities argued that America had not 
sought Turkey’s approval before the operation.90 In order to stop any possible 
refugee flow, Turkey closed the Habur border gate. The Turkish General Chief of 
Staff and his U.S. counterpart came together on February 22, 1999, to make 
some alterations in the Document of Engagement Rules, which had been signed 
by the military authorities of Turkey, the United States, and Britain earlier, in 
order to obligate the U.S. for prior consultation with Turkey in terms of these 
kinds of operations.  
In late 1998, Turkish-American decision makers cooperated on the the 
European Security and Defense Policy Initiative subject, which has distorted the 
Turkish EU aspiration. The ESDI has been the topic as the United States has 
supported the European countries while preserving its own concerns because of 
NATO. In December 1998, Britain and France signed the St. Malo Declaration. 
According to this declaration, the European Union (EU) would take its decisions 
about the subjects with respect to its own security and could automatically benefit 
from NATO’s planning and operational facilities without asking for other non-EU 
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members of NATO, like Turkey. In this context, Turkey was excluded from 
consultation and decision mechanisms; however, Turkey has asserted its veto 
power to impede this kind of automatic mechanism. This question remains  to be 
solved  at a  future date.91 
Another cooperation between Turkish-American decision makers came in 
1999. The capture of the bloody terrorist leader Abdullah Ocalan in Kenya 
through Turkish-U.S. intelligence cooperation is one of the most important events 
in 1999.  Turkish public opinion was very positive due to this cooperation, in 
terms of bilateral relations. However, the Turkish Prime Minister later commented 
that he could not understand the real intentions of the U.S. in this cooperation.92  
In addition to this, visits between top officials during 1999 accelerated 
bilateral relations. In April, Turkish President Suleyman Demirel visited the United 
States for NATO Summit. In September, Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit 
visited the United States in the aftermath of the Golcuk Earthquake which killed 
thousands in Turkey. In November, U.S. President Bill Clinton visited Turkey, 
addressing the Turkish Grand National Assembly. These visits strengthened the 
strategic nature of the relationship, which has been termed a strategic 
partnership as of September 1999, meaning that strategic cooperation is multi-
dimensional and multi-faceted and involves a wide range of overlapping interests 
in Europe, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East.93 
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III. RELATIONS IN THE AFTERMATH OF 9/11 
The Turkish-American relationship has been considered a strategic 
partnership by both nations since U.S. President Bill Clinton used the term in 
reference to the bilateral relations in his address at the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly in 1999. During this visit, Turkey and the United States also signed an 
agreement that laid down the foundation of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline 
project that both countries had envisioned and consulted over for years.94 The 
European Union, with the U.S.’s full support, recognized Turkey as a candidate 
country on December 11, 1999, at the end of Helsinki Summit.   
The year 2000 was important for both countries primarily for domestic 
reasons. The United States would elect its new president and Turkish President 
Suleyman Demirel’s presidential term would end; however, both countries 
increased diplomatic endeavors on the international scene, especially in regard 
to the Palestine-Israel problem. As a hopeful step toward the peace process, 
Israel withdrew from south Lebanon. In this context, the Camp David Summit 
was convened in July, but unfortunately, this summit ended fruitlessly.  
The terrorism issue has also never been off the agenda in Turkey, just as 
it has not for the U.S. after September 11. Turkey began the year with a heavy 
strike on the Hizbullah (The Party of God) terrorist organization by killing its 
leader Huseyin Velioglu and capturing many others.95 The operations against 
Hizbullah’s cells continued during the year.  
The capturing of its leader in 1999 by the Turkish-American cooperation 
had a deep impact on the PKK-KONGRA GEL. On the leadership level, the 
terrorist organization was divided. Osman Ocalan, Abdullah Ocalan’s brother, 
disagreed with the main group of the terrorist organization. In this situation, the 
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organization led by Murat Karayilan had continued to station itself in northern Iraq 
but it did not have any successful terrorist attacks in 2000.  
The European Security and Defense Initiative issue was brought up in the 
NATO Council of Ministers Meeting on May 24. Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail 
Cem restated Turkey’s view toward the ESDI and declared that Turkey was 
disappointed about the draft text that would be submitted by the EU on June 13, 
2000.96 The following day, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and 
Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem met and talked about Turkey–Greece 
relations, the Cyprus issue and the ESDI.97 Secretary Albright reaffirmed the 
United States’ opinion that Turkey could not be excluded in the security 
architecture of Europe. Unfortunately, Turkey’s concerns were not met during this 
summit.  
In September, Turkish President Ahmed Necdet Sezer and U.S. President 
Bill Clinton met during the U.N. Summit in New York. In this meeting, the Turkish 
President stated that Turkey was expecting that the Armenian Resolution in the 
U.S.  Congress would not pass. Therefore, this resolution was not put on the 
U.S. Congress’ agenda due to the Clinton administration’s successful press to 
Congress.  
In late November, Turkey had a financial crisis.98 The IMF (International 
Monetary Fund) did not lend the money it had pledged to Turkey according to 
stand-by agreements before the crisis took place.99 It was apparent that Turkey 
had not recovered from the devastating effect of the 1999 Golcuk earthquake. In 
collaboration with the Clinton administration, Turkey was able to satisfy IMF 
demands and reach an agreement for new credit support that generated $10 
billion dollars. 
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An economic crisis took hold of Turkey again in 2001. In the meantime, 
the Bush administration took charge of Washington, with no change in policy 
toward Turkey’s economic woes. The United States supported Turkey during its 
negotiations with the World Bank and the IMF.100 The Turkish-American bilateral 
relations were further enhanced by Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem’s visit to 
Washington in March 2001 where both parties shared their views on issues such 
as the ESDI and the Palestine-Israeli conflict.101 Consequently, it appeared that 
bilateral relations would be preserved, despite an administration change in 
Washington.  
Because Turkey as a country had combated PKK-KONGRA GEL 
terrorism since the 1980s, it condemned the September 11 terrorist attacks 
against the United States, declaring its decision to continue the battle against 
terrorism, and pledged its support.102 
In response to the September 11 attacks, the United States decided to 
catch Al Qaeda leaders and destroy their camps in Afghanistan. Turkey opened 
its airspace for flights in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and allowed the 
use of Incirlik air base in this framework. The Turkish Administration also 
dispatched ninety Special Forces personnel to Afghanistan and assigned Turkish 
personnel to Florida to support the U.S. anti-terror efforts.103  
Turkey’s immediate support evolved from three important agendas. First, 
the impact of the September 11 attacks also shocked Turkey and Turkey felt 
responsible to help its ally and strategic partner. Second, terrorism had been a 
central problem for Turkey for a long time, and Turkey strongly felt that there was 
no room for any tolerance of terrorism in Turkey or any place in the world. Third, 
                                            
100 Yakup Beris And Asli Gurkan, “Türk-Amerikan Ilişkilerine Bakis: Ana Temalar ve Guncel 
Gelismeler,” TUSIAD Washington Office (June 2002), p. 39 
http://www.tusiad.us/Content/uploaded/TURKIYE-ABD_ILISKILERI-UPDATE2.PDF (accessed 
March 1, 2007). 
101 Rachel Prager, “Turkish American Relations: Historical Context and Current Issues,” 
Georgetown University, 2003, p. 10, 
http://www.tusiad.us/content/uploaded/Prageltusiadsubmission.pdf (accessed March 1, 2007). 
102 Isyar, p. 37. 
103 Prager, p. 11. 
 28
it was a great opportunity for Turkey and the United States to collaborate and 
cooperate. Turkey had already had a large amount of experience in this matter 
and was ready and willing to share the lessons it had learned. And, hopefully, 
such cooperation would move Washington to support Ankara in its struggle 
against the PKK-KONGRA GEL.  
The September 11 attacks altered the Bush administration’s foreign policy 
agenda. According to the new agenda, the axis of evil and Al Qaeda are the 
enemies of the United States. Terrorism had become a primary problem for the 
United States; thus President Bush declared a Global War on Terrorism 
(GWOT).104 Consequently, Turkish-American bilateral relations had now become 
measured in terms of how much Turkey could/would contribute to the GWOT. 
For this reason, it could be said that the newly emerging U.S. GWOT policy 
narrowed the Turkish-American relationship into the area of security. 
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IV. THE INVASION OF IRAQ 
A. THE U.S. NORTHERN FRONT REQUEST 
Iraq had become the dominant issue in the Turkish-American relationship 
after 2002 because of the United States’ discomfort over the Saddam regime. 
Beginning with the visit of Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit to Washington on 
January 16, 2002, the United States shared its view with Turkey and waited for 
the Turkish response to this issue.105 From the very beginning, Turkey 
emphasized that the territorial integrity of Iraq must be protected.  
Washington shared its intentions regarding Iraq with the rest of the world 
through U.S. President Bush’s speech on January 29, 2002, where he referred to 
Iraq as one of the countries in the axis of evil.106 Turkey had shown its 
commitment to bilateral relations with the United States by taking command of 
the ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) in Afghanistan on June 20, 
2002. Less than a month later, Washington gathered Iraqi opposition group 
leaders,107 and Russian Assistant Foreign Minister Sultanov visited Ankara 
asking Turkey to act against the U.S.’s imminent military action.108  
U.S. Undersecretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, conveyed the first U.S. 
demands to Ankara in relation to Iraq on July 16, 2002, during his visit to Turkish 
Prime Minister Ecevit. Wolfowitz said that Washington hoped to see Ankara’s 
support during the Iraqi operation as an ally. In response, Ecevit reiterated 
Ankara’s opinion of the territorial integrity of Iraq, the future of northern Iraq and 
the security of Turcoman.109  It was also written that the United States and 
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Turkey would form a special channel, and Turkey would allow the passing of the 
U.S. Special Forces into northern Iraq accompanied by the Turkish Special 
Forces.110 
Turkish President Sezer and U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell met 
during the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg on 
September 4, 2002. Turkish President Sezer again reinforced the position that 
any operation in Iraq needed international legitimacy.111 The United States and 
Turkey signed an economic aid agreement totaling $200 million on September 
17, 2002. While the Bush administration was seeking approval from Congress in 
order to use military force in Iraq, Turkey continued consultations with other 
countries, including Iraq, in order to find ways to avoid the war. On October 15, 
2002, the U.S. delegation, headed by the U.S. Undersecretary of Defense, Paul 
Wolfowitz, gave a briefing to the Turkish administration and Turkish General Staff 
(TGS) explaining the American plan for Iraq and Turkey’s place in it.112 
According to the eighteen-page document, the United States’ demands were:113 
1. Allowing pre-deployment site surveys.  
2. Approval of the NILE (Northern Iraq Liaison Element) Teams.   
3. The stationing of 80,000 U.S. troops and 250 fighter planes in Turkey. 
4. The use of six main and eight supplementary airfields, plus two main 
and three supplementary ports in Turkey. 
5. Permission to use all Turkish lands for logistical support and 
unrestricted overflight. 
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In this briefing, the U.S. delegation also stressed these issues: 
1. A unified Iraq with territorial integrity (no Kurdish state). 
2. Equal treatment of all major ethnic groups (including Turcoman).  
3. Oil resources (i.e. Kirkuk) under control of a central government 
representative of the entire population. 
It appears from these points that the United States has been aware of 
major Turkish concerns in terms of Iraq.  The issue of the PKK-KONGRA-GEL 
was never mentioned throughout the briefing. In addition, the timeline of Turkish 
permission for logistical support and unrestricted overflight was also never 
mentioned throughout the briefing. However, during this critical period, Turkey 
had different concerns on its domestic scene. There was a general election on 
November 3, 2002, in Turkey. After the elections, the chief of the TGS, General 
Hilmi Ozkok, visited his counterpart, General Richard Myers, in Washington. He 
also met with U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney, U.S. Secretary of State Colin 
Powell, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his assistant, Paul 
Wolfowitz. At the press conference, he stated Turkish concerns about the U.S. 
plans:114 
1. The international legitimacy of the operation. 
2. The compensation for Turkish losses after the previous Gulf War and 
from the  upcoming war. 
3.  The future of Iraq and especially northern Iraq.  
In the meantime, the Turkish elections were finished, and the AKP (Justice 
and Development Party) had won. It was understood that the United States 
would repeat the talks and negotiations regarding the Northern Front with the 
newly elected Turkish administration. Thus, Wolfowitz and Grossman made 
another visit to Turkey on 3 December.  They met with the newly elected Turkish 
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Prime Minister, Abdullah Gul, and the head of the AKP Recep Tayyip Erdogan, 
who accepted U.S. requests to begin reconnaissance and construction of new 
facilities in Turkish bases and airports. As Aylin Guney relates, it is notable that 
the level of U.S. expectations from Turkey can best be understood by the 
following words of Paul Wolfowitz:115 
It involves not only the use of bases, but also possibly the use of 
land routes, the airspace, and questions, too, possibly about a role 
of Turkish forces. The United States is not in a position to make 
specific requests, and obviously, the Turkish Government is not in a 
position to give us specific answers. What is worth emphasizing is 
that I think we can count on the fact that Turkey will be with us. 
That is the important point. 
 
In this context, Erdogan visited Bush on December 11, 2002. After these 
meetings, there was a wide range of speculation, rumors and news about the 
U.S. demands on Turkey in the Turkish press. According to one legitimate 
newspaper article, the United States wanted to station 250,000 troops in Turkey 
and use Turkey as a logistical base, while promising to grant the international 
legitimacy of the operation, erasing Turkey’s military debts of up to six billion 
dollars, giving Turkey a share of Kirkuk’s oil revenue and granting Turkey some 
say on the future of northern Iraq.116The activity between the two countries could 
be observed on the Turkish-Iraqi border. Each day, as many as fifty trucks 
carrying U.S. military material, headed to northern Iraq.  
The pitfall of the negotiations, until December 13, was the EU 
Copenhagen Summit as Turkey was domestically and internationally 
preoccupied with the Copenhagen Summit’s possible decision that could begin  
accession talks between the EU and Turkey. Turkey focused on negotiations with 
the U.S. after the summit ended. On December 18, 2002, the Gul administration 
allowed U.S. authorities to complete an inspection of Turkish air bases for 
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modernization.117 The announcement of the Turkish presidency regarding Iraq 
on January 3 can be summed up as follows:118  
War in Iraq is a last resort. There is still hope for a peaceful 
solution. In order to start a war, there must be international 
legitimacy. UN Resolution 1441 would not approve a military action. 
Turkey has red lines in terms of Iraq. These are the territorial and 
political integrity of Iraq, and the future of Mosul and Kirkuk. 
 
As understood from the announcement, Turkey assumed that the war 
could be prevented. Thus, the following day, Turkish Prime Minister Gul started a 
regional tour that took him to Syria, Egypt, and Jordan and later to Saudi Arabia 
and Iran. In the meantime, the U.S. started its inspection of the Turkish bases 
and ports. Turkey emphasized clearly that the military action would need a UN 
Resolution and this was the requirement for broader Turkish support to visiting 
U.S. General Myers on January 19.119 In response to the Turkish position, 
General Myers stated that the United States would start the war with or without 
Turkey.120 On January 23, the foreign ministers of the Middle East states 
gathered in Istanbul as a consequence of Turkish Prime Minister Gul’s regional 
tour. At the end of the meeting, all states announced their desire for a peaceful 
solution in Iraq.121 
On January 31, the Turkish National Security Council convened for six 
and a half hours. The necessity for taking military measures was emphasized 
and it was recommended that the government should be ready to ask for 
permission from the parliament.122 According to the Turkish Constitution, the 
Administration should seek parliamentary approval in order to station foreign 
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troops on Turkish soil. Moreover, according to the Turkish Constitution, if these 
foreign troops attacked another country from Turkish soil, international legitimacy 
would be needed for this situation. After this date, the Gul Administration gave up 
its attempts for a peaceful solution and focused more on negotiations with 
Washington. According to Gul, Turkey did its best to stop the war; however, all  
attempts proved fruitless and now it was time to think about what was best for 
Turkey.123 In light of this, on February 6, the TGNA accepted Turkish Prime 
Minister Gul’s request for permission to station U.S. technical and military 
personnel for three months in order to modernize the Turkish bases and ports ― 
by a majority of votes.124 
However, there were some restrictions on Turkey’s desire to cooperate 
with America. Due to France and Germany’s declaration of their opposition to the 
U.S. invasion of Iraq,125 Turkey did not want to jeopardize its candidacy for the 
EU by its partnership with Washington on the pending war in Iraq. Thus, it can be 
understood that transatlantic relations had narrowed Ankara’s flexibility. Not only 
was international and domestic public opposition to war very high, but Turkish 
polls indicated that the great majority of the Turkish people (77.8 percent) 
thought that Turkey should oppose the war and not help the United States in any 
way — neither offering its military forces nor allowing the use of its military 
bases.126 As a result, Turkish decision makers lacked moral and popular grounds 
for the impending war while arguing their concern for protecting Turkey’s 
relationship with the United States. In the end, Turkish economic concerns about 
the war and economic negotiations with the United States sometimes took place 
in a humiliating manner in both the international and domestic media. For 
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instance, William Safire wrote in the New York Times, “an alliance with a price 
tag is no alliance at all” ― referring to the negotiations between Turkey and the 
U.S.127 On the other hand, the first Gulf War cost Turkey more than 100 billion 
dollars. With this experience, it was hard for Turkey not to bring up economic 
issues at the negotiation table.  
In addition to the emotionally-charged opinions over how to handle this 
latest crisis, there were disagreements between Washington and Ankara during 
the negotiations regarding the military, economic, and political fields. First, while 
the United States wanted to preserve general command over all troops, Turkey 
insisted on commanding its own troops. This issue was resolved with a close 
coordination formula. Second, while the United States offered a 6 billion dollar 
package, Turkey asked for a 25 billion dollar package, which was to span  five 
years. Third, while Turkey wanted to sign an agreement on the future of Iraq, the 
United States wanted to rely on its word from Turkey.128 
Without reaching a consensus on these issues, the motion that would 
allow the United States to deploy sixty-two thousand troops, two hundred fifty-five 
planes, and sixty-five helicopters for six months in Turkey was tabled in the 
TGNA on March 1, 2003. The result was: two hundred sixty-four in favor, two 
hundred fifty-one against, with nineteen abstentions. Although it had achieved 
the majority, the vote had failed to reach the overall majority that was necessary 
for it to pass. The motion failed by three votes.129 
B. THE U.S. INVASION OF IRAQ 
On March 2, the Turkish administration announced that nothing had been 
finalized and signaled that they would try to prepare a second motion. However, 
the second motion had not come before parliament by March 15 when U.S. 
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Secretary of State Colin Powell announced that the negotiations with Turkey 
were not valid, and the United States would continue by itself.130In return, the 
motion that was accepted on March 20 only allowed the Turkish administration to 
dispatch Turkish troops to northern Iraq and to allow for the use of Turkish 
airspace by the foreign country for six months.131 
It can be argued that the TGNA’s decision on March 1 was a reflection 
and a combination of these factors: 
1. Absence of international legitimacy for military action towards Iraq. 
2. Turkey’s infamous experience in the first Gulf War.  
3. Turkey’s unmet demands about the future of Iraq and the economic aid    
package. 
4.  Opposition to war domestically and internationally.  
5.  Washington’s coercive behavior toward Turkey. 
6.  Middle East countries’, France and Germany’s opposition to war. 
Washington, concerned with Turkey’s possible military action into northern 
Iraq after the U.S. invasion started on March 20, was still without a northern front. 
On March 23, U.S. President Bush stated that:132 
We have got more troops up north, and we're making it very clear 
to the Turks that we expect them not to come into Northern 
Iraq…and they know we're working with the Kurds to make sure 
there's not an incident that would cause there to be an excuse to go 
into Northern Iraq. 
On the other hand, the chief of TGS General Ozkok gave a press 
conference on March 26, and there he emphasized that:133 
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It is hard for Turkey to understand those who would perceive 
threats from across the ocean but do not accept when Turkey 
perceives threat from its own borders. 
   
Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan wrote an article in the Wall Street Journal 
on April 1 to warm the relations, and U.S. Secretary of State Powell visited 
Ankara on the following day to ask for Ankara’s support for the Iraqi invasion. 
Ankara increased its logistical support after this visit.134 U.S. President Bush 
declared that the major combat operations ended on May 1.135  
In the days and weeks that followed, the bilateral relations between the 
U.S. and Turkey suffered greatly as a result of Paul Wolfowitz’s statement that 
Turkey should apologize to the United States for denying the U.S. northern front 
request; however, he later withdrew his statement.136 The main incident that 
shook the bilateral relations, later to become known as the hood event, took 
place in a Turkish Special Forces camp in Sulaymaniyah, a city in northern Iraq, 
on July 4, 2003. There, eleven Turkish soldiers were taken as detainees by the 
U.S. forces on charges that they were conspiring to assassinate elected officials 
there. After sixty hours, the Turkish soldiers were returned to Sulaymaniyah. 
Nevertheless, the impact of the event, especially to the Turkish public, was 
tremendous and was described by General Ozkok as the largest crisis of 
confidence — ever―  between the two countries.137 
Turkish Foreign Minister Gul visited the United States on March 22, and 
after that time, Turkey’s possible troop contribution in Iraq became debatable 
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upon U.S. request. In the economic field, Turkey and the United States signed an 
agreement that provided for an 8.5 billion dollar credit for Turkey in late 
September.138 Moreover, upon Washington’s troop request, the Turkish 
administration prepared a motion for TGNA’s voting on October 7. The motion 
passed, but on November 6 Washington expressed that there was no need for 
Turkish troops.139 Inexplicably, Bush, in a discussion about the November 15 
terrorist bombing that took place in Istanbul, referred to Turkey as a front country 
in the Global War on Terror.140 The terrorists claimed their relation with Al Qaeda 
at the end of the investigations by the Turkish police.141 It can be argued that the 
bilateral relations gained positive momentum after the terrorist attacks in Istanbul; 
however, it was too early to say that the relationship had fully recovered in late 
2003.  
C. THE AFTERMATH OF THE INVASION 
The year 2004 started with quite a positive atmosphere for the bilateral 
relations. In January, the U.S. designated the PKK/KONGRA-GEL and its 
affiliates a terrorist organization. The Bush administration began to focus on the 
Greater Middle East and the North African Initiative, and Turkey was considered 
a core country in this regard.142 In line with this view, the NATO Summit was held 
in Istanbul, and President Bush declared that Turkey was vitally important for the 
cultivation of peace in Europe and the Middle East.143  
                                            
138 8.5 milyar dolarlik imza, Radikal 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/veriler/2003/09/23/haber_89652.php (accessed March 1, 2007). 
139 Balbay, p. 423. 
140 President Condemns Terrorist Attacks in Turkey, U.S. Department of State 
http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2003/26558.htm (accessed March 1, 2007). 
141 Karl Vick, “Al-Qaeda's Hand In Istanbul Plot,” The Washington Post 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021201715.html 
(accessed March 1, 2007).  
142 R. Nicholas Burns, “The New NATO and the Greater Middle East,” U.S. Department of 
State http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2003/25602.htm (accessed March 1, 2007). 
143 President Bush Discusses Democracy, Freedom from Turkey, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040629-4.html (accessed March 1, 2007).  
 39
This period of time also witnessed increasing Turkish-American 
cooperation in relation to Iraq. Many Turkish companies took part in the 
reconstruction of Iraq after the war, allowing much aid and assistance to pass 
through the Turkish-Iraq border.  
This recovery period of the Turkish-American relations happened mainly 
through reciprocal visits. As R. Nicholas Burns commented, “Turkey and the U.S. 
have turned the corner at the end of this period.”144 In February 2005, The U.S. 
secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, visited Turkey to discuss a contemporary 
agenda. Following this visit, on 13 February, Turkey took command of ISAF in 
Afghanistan.  
Acting on U.S. demands, the Turkish administration prepared a request 
from the Turkish Grand National Assembly that would allow the U.S. to use 
Incirlik air base in Turkey as a logistics hub for the operations in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. This request was passed by the parliament, but the motion restricted the 
transport of any weapons.  
In June 2005, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan met with President Bush in 
Washington. After the meeting, Bush used the term strategic relations in order to 
describe the warming bilateral relations, showing that the bilateral relations had 
improved significantly.    
On the other hand, on 16 July 2005, five tourists died because of a bomb 
attack by the PKK/KONGRA-GEL in Kusadasi. This was the first PKK/KONGRA-
GEL attack after nearly a year of inaction. In the years following, the 
PKK/KONGRA-GEL terrorist activities have increased and become a central 
matter on the bilateral agenda.  
Since 2003, Washington’s concern had been Turkey’s increasing relations 
with Tehran and Damascus. Turkish President Sezer met with Syrian President 
Assad in April 2005, in Damascus, to return Assad’s visit to Ankara in 2004. The 
U.S. ambassador, Edelman, expressed U.S. discomfort with this visit.  
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In December 2006, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan met with Iranian 
President Ahmadinejad in Tehran. Following this visit, in June 2007, the two 
countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding that concerned an energy 
agreement. With this agreement, Turkey guaranteed to produce natural gas in 
Iran and a thirty billion cubic meter natural gas purchase per year. Although Umut 
Arik, a former Turkish ambassador, has rightly remarked that Turkey was taking 
proactive steps to mediate between its friends and neighbors,145 R. Nicolas 
Burns, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, states that Washington was 
troubled by Turkey’s cooperative stance with Iran.146 Although relations 
continued to improve, the critical issues of Iran, Syria, PKK/KONGRA_GEL and 
Iraq proved to create problems between the U.S. and Turkey that impacted 
continuing bilateral agendas and agreements.  
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
A. CONCLUSION 
For nearly sixty years, Turkey and the U.S. have developed a relationship 
with ups and downs, sometimes referred to as a strategic partnership and 
sometimes as an alliance. The two countries have signed nearly two hundred 
agreements throughout these years.147 However, events following the 
September 11 attacks showed that the parameters of the bilateral relations have 
changed significantly. Today, it is hard to say what the common purpose of the 
relationship is ― in contrast to what it was during the Cold War. After the 
September 11 attacks, Turkish decision makers assumed that fighting against 
terrorism could be the common purpose of the relationship. However, the March 
1, 2003, decision of the TGNA and  U.S. inaction toward the PKK have muddled 
this assumption, although Turkey has provided critical support to the U.S. both 
during and after the invasion of Iraq. In Afghanistan, Turkey has commanded the 
ISAF twice, participated in reconstruction efforts and shared joint rotational 
command of ISAF with France and Italy. 
In short, after September 11, it can be argued that the main pillars of the 
relationship emerged as: peace, democracy, free market, freedom, and 
prosperity. This set of broad terms is relative, however. The relationship needs 
more examination and definition. It can be expected that relations will be closer 
when both countries’ policies match, but will be tougher when the countries’ 
policies contradict. Washington and Turkey should not expect the same cohesion 
in their partnership that they once had in the Cold War period.    
Moreover, as Kemal Koprulu argues, there has been a confidence 
problem between the two countries during the last decades.148 Consequently, we 
see that Turkish public opinion is 83 percent unfavorable to the U.S. and 91 
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percent opposed to the GWOT.149 In order to understand the reasoning behind 
the Turkish public opinion of the U.S., the following arguments are offered. 
1. PKK/KONGRA-GEL 
PKK/KONGRA-GEL exploited the power vacuum in northern Iraq after 
1991. Turkish forces with cross border operations executed more than a hundred 
cross-border operations from 1992–1997 against them.150 In 1999, the capture of 
its leader impacted the terrorist organization deeply, and the PKK/KONGRA-GEL 
withdrew to the inner parts of Iraq ― mainly the Qandil Mountain region. In the 
aftermath of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the terrorist organization got stronger, 
buying new weapons and bombs that cost as much as 5.5 million euros.151 The 
terrorist organization broke its so-called unilateral cease-fire in June 2004.152 
Thus, terrorist activities resumed their 1990s levels. General Yasar Buyukanit’s 
remark that the C-4, a powerful explosive, had become an indispensable 
component of terrorists’ backpacks fits well in terms of terrorist activities in those 
years.153 
 Turkish suspicions about U.S. motives toward PKK/KONGRA-GEL grew 
as the U.S. continued to ignore the fact that the terrorist organization had 
increased its bloody activities in Turkey. However, after the invasion of Iraq, U.S. 
authorities wanted the Turks to leave the PKK/KONGRA-GEL problem to 
them.154 Contradictorily, the arms that had been seized from the terrorist 
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organization appear to belong to the U.S.,155 even though the United States 
declared that Washington had no policy to arm the terrorist organization ― while 
accepting that they were U.S. arms.156 In addition to this, arrested 
PKK/KONGRA-GEL terrorists claimed that U.S. officers visited the terrorists’ 
camps in the Qandil Mountains many times and brought money, arms, and talked 
with the current leader of the terrorist organization.157 The existence of the 
helicopter-landing zone in the terrorist organization’s camp was introduced as 
proof to their claims because only the U.S. had helicopters in the region. 
More than forty thousand Turkish people lost their lives because of 
PKK/KONGRA-GEL’s bloody campaign.158 The terrorist organization has 
condensed its activities in the last two years. The mechanism, which was set up 
by the U.S. and Turkey to counter PKK/KONGRA-GEL terrorism, also proved to 
be fruitless; thus, both generals quit their jobs after one year.159  In addition to 
all of these efforts to counter terrorism with the aid of the U.S., Turkey signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding with Iraq on August 7. In this document, the Iraqi 
government promised to eliminate PKK/KONGRA-GEL and its affiliations in 
Iraq.160  
Turkey had patiently waited for its respondents to act while almost every 
day Turkish people were losing their lives to terrorism. The inaction of both the 
U.S. and Iraqi governments finally forced Turkey to take the initiative itself. This 
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came in the form of a motion by the Turkish Grand National Assembly on 
October 17 of this year, allowing the Turkish administration to send troops into 
Iraq to counter PKK/KONGRA-GEL terrorists.161  
However, most recently, a hopeful step for the future of the bilateral 
relations took place on November 5 during Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s visit 
to Washington. There, President Bush affirmed that the PKK is a terrorist 
organization, and that it is an enemy of Turkey; it is an enemy of Iraq, and it is an 
enemy of the United States.162 
2. Northern Iraq 
After the first Gulf War, a no-fly zone was established over northern Iraq, 
enabling the Kurds to establish a de facto autonomy.163 The objective of this 
arrangement, in Turkish minds, was to protect the people from Saddam’s 
brutality and to ensure that the refugees could return to their homes safely. The 
borders of this zone somehow left Turcoman to Saddam’s pity. Thus, this zone 
did not protect Turcoman from Saddam in 1996 when he hanged thirty-five 
Turcoman leaders.164  
In the absence of Saddam’s power, in 1992, a Kurdish parliament was set 
up, primarily composed of Barzani and Talabani’s forces. Meanwhile, Turkey was 
struggling with the PKK/KONGRA-GEL. In this atmosphere, Turkey established 
good relations with all the people in northern Iraq against its most significant 
threat, the PKK/KONGRA-GEL. At the same time, Turkey tried to create a 
peaceful environment among these groups.  
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Even in 1994, when the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the 
Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) started to fight with each other, Turkey tried to 
negotiate with both parties. In 1996, at Turkey’s insistence, both parties signed a 
cease-fire. That same year, the Ankara Process, a diplomatic effort with the aim 
of consolidating a cease-fire, was initiated.165 In return, Turkey’s influence in the 
region increased. However, the U.S. brought Barzani and Talabani to 
Washington to sign an agreement, excluding Turkey from the process.166 This 
did much to increase Turkish suspicions about the real intentions of the U.S. in 
the region.167 
Before the U.S. invasion of Iraq, in spite of Turkey’s concern, the U.S. 
supported the reopening of the Kurdish parliament in October 2002.168 During 
the U.S. invasion, the Kurdish forces, Peshmerga, set fire to the population and 
title records of the Kirkuk region, but warnings from Turkey forced them to 
retreat.169  
         After the invasion, as a response to the U.S. request, Turkey decided to 
send troops to Iraq. However, Kurdish groups opposed this idea and the U.S. 
removed its request from the table.  
Today, it is apparent that these groups feel some discontent toward 
Turkey, however; it is hard to understand their motivations from a Turkish 
perspective. Even today, Turkey provides the fuel, the food and water consumed 
by Iraqis, and naturally, by these groups.170 Moreover, Turkey imports electricity 
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into northern Iraq at a much cheaper rate than the Turks themselves pay for it.171 
As in 1991, Turkey continues to provide as much as it can to the Iraqi people and 
desires the well-being of all Iraqi people.   
The future of Iraq is significant for Turkey. Turkey wants to see a unified 
and stable Iraq for the benefit of the future of the whole region. This also means 
that Turkey opposes the idea of any independent Kurdish state in the region. 
This sensitivity of Turkey has been well known by both the U.S. and the Iraqis. 
However, there have been attempts by Kurdish groups to force a demographic 
change in the Turkmen-populated cities of Kirkuk and Telafer whereby Turkmens 
are being replaced with Kurds.172  
In March 2005, the chair of the Ankara branch office of the Iraqi Turkmen 
Culture and Cooperation Association, Mahmut Kasapoglu, stated that because of 
the U.S. military operation in Telafer, over thirty thousand Turkmens had to leave 
their homes. Kasapoglu argued, “The American military operation, with the 
collaboration of local Kurds, sought to erase the Turkmen-populated region 
located between the Barzani region in northern Iraq and the Syrian Kurds.”173 
Umit Ozdag, an important Turkish scholar, comments, “The U.S. military 
operation was aimed at forcing the Turkmen population in Tal Afar to emigrate 
and to ensure their replacement by a flow of Kurdish migrants.”174 
Another incident that has fed suspicion about U.S. motives happened at 
the NATO Defense College in Italy on September 15, 2006. There, during one 
seminar, an American lieutenant colonel used a map showing eighteen different 
                                            
171 İste Turkiye'nin enerji politikası: Vatandasa pahalı, Irakliya ucuz elektrik, Radikal 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=224589 (accessed August 1, 2007).  
172 Banu Eligur, “Turkish-American relations since the 2003 Iraqi War: A Troubled 
Partnership,” Middle East Brief, No. 6, (May 2006), p. 3. 
173 Ibid. 
174 Banu Eligur, “Turkish-American relations since the 2003 Iraqi War: A Troubled 
Partnership,” Middle East Brief, No. 6, (May 2006), p. 3. 
 47
cities in Turkey inside an area labeled "Kurdistan."175 This event concluded with 
phone calls between both countries’ Chiefs of General Staff.  
It is also a fact that more events have happened than can be cited here in 
this context. On the other hand, the events cited here have satisfactorily reflected 
Turkish opinion on these matters. The perception of Turkish sensitivity from the 
U.S. side will also be understood in the near future.  As Sanli Bahadir Koc 
expressed, the referendum in Kirkuk will be the best indicator as to U.S. attitudes 
and its plans for the future of northern Iraq.176    
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Before attempting to express the recommendations, it is best to 
emphasize that according to the polls, 74 percent of the Turkish people see the 
PKK/KONGRA-GEL as the thorniest issue in the Turkish-American 
relationship.177 Above all, it is highly important to restore confidence. To do this, 
the PKK/KONGRA-GEL must be eliminated and both countries should work hard 
to preserve Iraq’s territorial integrity. Another factor that demands attention is that 
of the European Union’s effect on Turkish-American bilateral relations. In 
contrary to Graham E. Fuller’s statement that:178 
In my view, the world will likely witness increasing tactical and even 
strategic divergence between the U.S. and EU that to some extent 
will be natural, regardless of who holds political power in 
Washington. 
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It is assumed here that transatlantic relations will not diverge, and in 
return, will not have negative consequences on Turkish-American bilateral 
relations. Hereafter, Turkey and the U.S. will have more avenues to share, 
cooperate, and even fight for. To achieve the aim of this thesis to restore and 
improve relations, Turkey and the United States can follow three paths.  
1. Alliance 
Turkey and the U.S. decision makers, as it can be understood from 
Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s last visit to Washington, tend to call the 
relations a strategic partnership. This terminology has two consequences. The 
first one is in the decision makers’ minds, and the second one is in people’s 
minds. With this terminology, both parties assume that the other party shares the 
same strategic interests for realizing their expectations. For instance, in 2003, 
before the invasion, Turkish consent to allow the U.S. to open the northern front 
was a prevention-taking measure as well as a desire to have a say in the future 
of Iraq; it was not about the overthrow of Saddam. For this reason, it is better to 
term the relationship an alliance, at least for now.  
Moreover, this author does not agree with Kemal Koprulu, who argues:179 
The fundamental difference between Washington and Ankara in 
their Middle East approach is that Washington supports change 
and Ankara is supporting the status quo. 
 
Actually, the main difference is that Ankara does not have a preemptive 
strategy. Besides, Turkey, in parallel with Ataturk, sees the war as a crime, even 
if it is inevitable. However, when national interests are at stake, Turkey does not 
hesitate to act militarily. For instance, in 1998 Turkey threatened a military 
intervention with Syria.180 
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This author agrees with R. Nicholas Burns that the year 2008 will be very 
important in terms of bilateral relations.181 The U.S. decision makers look to the 
Middle East from their greater or broader Middle East perspective. As understood 
from the Shared Vision statement signed by both parties, the Turkish 
administration has also accepted this plan.182 In turn then, it can be argued that 
the main choke point is how this plan will be executed. Moreover, this issue has 
been a main point of tension on the bilateral agenda for both administrations.  
The U.S. administration’s focus on Iran and Syria will increase if there is 
no change in Washington’s policy. However, Turkey has strengthened its ties 
with both countries in the last few years. Syria and Iran expressed their support 
for Turkey in its fight against the PKK/KONGRA-GEL and offered cooperation 
against terrorism.183 Turkey and Iran signed energy agreements in 2007,184 but 
the U.S. administration criticized this agreement.185 As Janice Weiner, a political 
officer in the US Embassy in Ankara comments:186 
While we understand the importance of Turkey having stable 
relations with neighbors, we strongly differ on the means. 
 
It is obvious that the U.S. and Turkey will not be able to agree on policies 
toward Syria and Iran. At first glance, the countries’ policies seem to contradict 
eac other, however, the policies can also be seen as complementary. Turkey’s 
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diplomatic efforts can lead to a success for both issues ― even for the whole 
region. As Graham E. Fuller cites:187 
Turkish-U.S. relations will flourish, and Turkey will be more likely to 
contribute to stability in the region as a whole if the United 
States…allows Turkey to develop its own independent regional 
relations. 
 
If the proliferation of the shared values in the Middle East is the objective for both 
U.S. and Turkish administrations, then there should be no disagreement as long 
as the objective is achieved. 
2. Balkans, Caucasus, and Central Asia 
Washington focuses on the nuclear efforts in Iran as a primarily a bomb-
building one, and the Bush administration has declared several times that a 
military option was on the table against Iran.188 If we assume that the Bush 
administration decides to act militarily against Iran and seek Turkey’s 
cooperation, this situation will be very difficult for Turkey. Even though Turkey 
has affirmed that a nuclear-powered Iran would not be welcomed in Turkey, in 
the absence of a UN decision, Turkey will not participate in any military action 
against Iran.189 If we take this assumption as a reference, then stability in the 
Middle East cannot be realized in the near future.  
Turkey and the U.S. cannot expect cooperation from one another until 
someone changes its policy. Therefore, in the meantime, both countries should 
focus their attention more on the other regions. Turkey and the U.S. have 
common interests in the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia. While both 
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countries act unilaterally, according to their national interests in the Middle East, 
they can continue to cooperate in the other regions. In short, while Turkey and 
the U.S. carry out an “ignoring-the-obvious” policy in the Middle East toward each 
other, they could and should preserve their alliance of close cooperation in the 
other regions. 
3. Strategic Partnership 
It is acceptable that Turkey and the United States term their relationship  
an alliance in the two previous discussions. However, in this discussion, the 
bilateral relationship has a chance to evolve to the strategic partnership level. As 
John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt argue, Israel and the Israeli lobby in the 
U.S. shape Washington’s Middle East policy.190 If the Bush administration (or the 
following administration) changes its U.S.-Middle East policy and centers it on 
Turkey instead of Israel, then the alliance would strengthen and flourish.  
Of course, this does not mean that Washington’s close relationship with 
Israel is an impediment to the U.S. relationship with Turkey. Turkey, too, has 
good relations with Israel. But, what is argued is that if Turkey became the center 
of the U.S.-Middle East policy, it would be easier to reach a solution in the Middle 
East Peace process. Moreover, this would also lead to a decrease in anti-
Americanism in the Middle East region. Peace and stability in the Middle East 
would have huge consequences throughout the world, and these successes 
would encourage people toward democracy and freedom.  
Turkey and the U.S. will more than likely choose one of the options listed 
above. Nonetheless, it is important to create different networks between two 
nations. Moreover, as O. Faruk Logoglu touched on, the seven billion dollar trade 
volume was not sufficient.191 More importantly, interaction among social groups, 
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NGOs, think tanks, business associations, sport clubs, universities, and many 
other apolitical institutions and civil societies are vital for the future of the bilateral 
relations. It is these more important motivations that come from the people of 
both countries that would be instrumental in improving and strengthening the 
bilateral relationship between Turkey and the U.S.  
In order to achieve this, a mutual fund that can be used by both countries’ 
civil societies could be constituted. The civil societies’ interactions may be 
integral in eliminating the Armenian Resolution crisis. Consequently, this will 
create an atmosphere where both nations can look at the situations from the 
other’s perspective, a prerequisite for a healthy and strong relationship. 
Finally, it is important to remember and mention Ataturk’s vision of 
Turkish-American relations. It is a duty for citizens of both nations, especially in 
troubled times, to refresh our minds with this great leader’s vision:192 
The Turks are already a democratic nation. If this fact has not been 
understood by today’s civilized world I must direct attention to the 
remarkable comments made by U.S. ambassador regarding the 
last days of the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, the American 
people have always relied and depended on democracy to identify 
them as a nation since their inception. It has been through this 
blessing that they have been placed amongst today’s civilized world 
as a new country. This has given them acceptance as a new 
nation. Thus the Turkish people feel a strong sentiment of love and 
understanding towards the American people. I do hope that the 
observation of this fact will encourage further dialogue and warm 
relations between the two nations; but this will not be all! I am sure 
that this will also allow the rest of the civilized world to have more 
good will towards one another and erase all past negative fables 
and experiences; thus leading the world towards a more peaceful 
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